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Abstract 
 
The study was an attempt aimed at understanding the relationship between the United States national interests in Nigeria and 
the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. It raised the pertinent question of why the United States is involved in the fight against 
Boko Haram terrorism. Using a qualitative approach, the study discovered that the United States national interests remain 
largely unchanged and its averred condemnation of foreign terrorism incontestable, and therefore, responsible for its 
involvement in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. However, since the designation of the group as Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) by the United States, its members appear more determined, ferocious and coordinated in their attacks 
against the Nigerian state. To this end, the work recommended that the global community should see the fight against Boko 
Haram scourge from the prism of international terrorism and thereby contribute immensely to arrest it. 
 
Keywords: United States, national interests, terrorism, boko haram 
 
 
 Introduction 1.
 
The United States’ national interest in Nigeria has increasingly remained consistent over the years and it appears that not 
even the Boko Haram insurgence can significantly change it. However, to underrate the possibility of Boko Haram 
insurgence significantly affecting the United States interests in Nigeria due largely to the concentration of the sect’s 
activities in the North-Eastern part of the country is to undermine the capability of the group’s impact on the security of 
both countries. Against this backdrop, many analysts have drawn the attention of the United States government in 
assisting Nigeria in finding a lasting solution to the problem posed by the group (Ham, 2012; Oritsejafor, 2012; Campbell, 
2012 and Meehan, 2012). 
Consequently, Boko Haram, properly called Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad, meaning “people 
committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad” has undoubtedly appeared to pose serious security 
threat to the governments of both the United States and Nigeria. Its leader Abubakar Shakau has continually threatened 
that the moment they were through with the Nigerian government, their next target would be the United States, seen to be 
the leading agent in the propagation of the western values (boko) which the sect considers to be sin (haram). 
Notwithstanding this threat, the government of the United State has hitherto seen the group not to possess the magic 
wands necessary to make real its threats. However, given the successful execution of the group’s terrorist acts within and 
outside the shores of Nigeria, including the kidnapping of foreign expatriates in Cameroon and Niger Republic, the United 
States government appears to be faced bare with the realities on ground and the capability of the sect in carrying out its 
threats; hence, the recent designation as Foreign Terrorist Organization. 
Meanwhile, the Boko Haram sect ab initio made its stand known and subsequently adopted violent philosophy in 
pursuit of its goals whereas the United States continued to underplay the activities of the group as a mere expression of 
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grievances against the Nigerian state by the members until recently when it became clear to the country that such 
assumption was wrong. This necessitated open commitment of the American government in finding a lasting solution to 
the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria by way of labeling the sect Foreign Terrorist Organization. However, it does appear that 
since this designation, the sect has become more determined and ferocious in their attacks than before. More than one 
thousand five hundred (1500) deaths have been recorded within the period alone (Amnesty International, 2014 and 
Bekele, 2014) in addition to the abduction of over 200 school girls at Chibok, Borno state. The study therefore aims to 
understand the relationship between the United States’ national interests in Nigeria and its involvement in the fight 
against Boko Haram terrorism. 
Methodologically, the study is specifically a qualitative one which relies mostly on documentary evidence and 
generation of tables for lucid clarification of data as well as the understanding of the argument. 
 
 The United States’ National Interest in Nigeria and the Fight Against Boko Haram 2.
 
The US national interest in Nigeria can be summarized as follows: 
- Stable democracy with business friendly environment 
- Free flow of crude oil 
- Partnership for the maintenance of regional peace and security. 
Due largely to the fact that the focus of the study is not on the first two, we shall therefore deal with only the US 
partnership with Nigeria in the maintenance of regional peace and security which has implication on the fight against 
Boko Haram terrorism. 
It is absolutely undisputable that Nigeria is a regional power and therefore indispensable by the United States for 
the maintenance of regional peace and security. Nigeria has contributed immensely in peacekeeping missions around the 
world; both under the auspices of the UN, AU and ECOWAS. Some of these peacekeeping missions include: Cong, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, among others, and in each of these, Nigeria had excelled as a regional power (Sanda, 2010). 
Indeed, Jega and Farris (2010: 231) have observed that: 
Peacekeeping, peace building, peace enforcement, and peace-support operations constitute a major area of 
achievement in Nigeria’s involvement in global affairs. Beginning with participation in the UN Mission in the Congo (1960-
1964) to its foray in Chad (1979-1982); through its contributions to UN missions in Lebanon (1978-1981) and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1992-1995); its involvement with African Union (AU) missions in Darfur, Sudan (since, 2004); and its 
leadership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) through the Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations in Liberia (1990-1998) and Sierra Leone (1996-2000), as well as 
its interventions in Guinea Bissau (1998-2000) and Cote d’Ivoire (since, 2000), Nigeria has helped to contain  conflicts, 
minimize suffering, restore order, reconstruct war-torn societies, and pave the way for transitions to civil rule and 
democratization. 
Due largely to these crucial roles, the US cannot afford to lose sight of this gigantic edifice called Nigeria to 
insurgence thereby creating lacuna in those areas the country had excelled. In view of the foregoing, the former Vice 
President of Nigeria, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, in his address at the University of California, Los Angeles, persuading the US 
that in the emerging New World Order, the destiny of Nigeria and the US are irrevocably intertwined, observed as follows: 
…may I remark that in a rather ironic twist of historical fate, it has been over a century America’s lot to critically 
influence the course of world history. This cannot be totally divorced from its population, size, resource potentials and 
profile as an established democracy. Nigeria’s population, size, resource potentials and leadership profile within the 
comity of Africa’s emerging democracies also set her apart. Thus, while Nigeria is transiting from age-old military 
dictatorship into the realm of civilian democracy, the world is also transiting into a new international order. For Nigeria’s 
transition to succeed, collaboration with the international community is vital; and for the current transition to new world 
order to succeed, the cooperation of emerging democracies is imperative. Nigeria and the United States therefore carry 
the dreams of the people of the earth and hence hold a significant stake in shaping the destiny of our evolving new world 
order. We cannot afford to fail; we should not even contemplate the possibilities of failure. Nigeria stands prepared to play 
its part. But because every chain is as strong as its weakest link, America must share its strength with Nigeria in this 
regard so that together we can live the promise of our vision of a better world (cited in Adogamhe, 2006: 113). 
However, the partnership with Nigeria for the pursuit and maintenance of regional peace and security by the United 
States appears incontestable. Another benefit that accrues to the US government from this partnership is reduction in the 
financial resources necessary to maintain peace and security around the world especially within Africa.  
Having understood the basis of the United States’ national interest in Nigeria especially as it affects this work, it is 
important to relate its foreign policy thrust to the fight against Boko Haram terrorism not only Nigeria but also in the West 
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African sub region. 
Since the notorious 9/11 attacks on the United States twin towers (Pentagon and World Trade Center), the 
country’s foreign policy to international terrorism assumed a new shape. This new development involves taking the fight 
against terrorism to the host country instead of waiting until the terrorist activities get to the US soil. The 9/11 attacks also 
strengthened the US fight against terrorism. Against this backdrop, it is important to understand what terrorism is all 
about, at least, in the context of this study. Terrorism has been identified as a foreign policy issue, as well as a national 
Security issue (Pillar, 2001: 9). Deriving from the above, Pillar remarked that: 
Most of the terrorism that has damaged US interest is foreign, as are most of the significant terrorist threats that 
confront the United States today. Seventy-eight percent of the Americans who died from terrorism during the past two 
decades were killed by foreign terrorists (Pillar, 2001: 9). 
Terrorism itself has elicited unquantifiable definitional wrangles that have combined to compound its meaning. 
However, Pillar (2001: 13) has identified four main elements that distinguish terrorism from other acts of violence. These 
elements include: 
1. Premeditation: this means that there must be an intent and prior decision to commit an act that would qualify 
as terrorism under the other criteria. An operation may not be executed as intended and may fail altogether, 
but the intent must still be there. Terrorism is not a matter of momentary rage or impulse or even a matter of 
accident. 
2. Political Motivation: terrorism excludes criminal violence motivated by monetary gain or personal vengeance 
except if such has direct bearing to the implementation of the terrorists’ objectives. Nevertheless, other forms 
of criminal violence have been tagged terrorism but the fundamental difference between terrorism and other 
forms of crime or criminal violence lies in the onus of what gives rise to it and how it must be countered, 
beyond simple physical security and police techniques. What terrorists have in common that separates them 
from other violent criminals is that they claim to be serving some greater good. 
3. The targets are non-combatant groups: this suggests that terrorists attack people who cannot defend 
themselves with violence in return. 
4. The perpetrators are either sub-national groups or clandestine agents. 
Terrorism in this context therefore means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Any act of 
violence that meets these criteria could be tagged Terrorism. 
Consequent upon the foregoing, the US interest in maintaining zero tolerance to international terrorism gave rise to 
the establishment of section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 2001 as amended which empowers the US 
Secretary of State with the approval of the President to label any violent group(s) found to be involved in terrorist activities 
outside the United States, Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). For a group to be qualified as a terrorist organization, it 
must possess the following: 
1. The group must be domiciled in a foreign country (that is, outside the US territory). 
2. The group must be involved in terrorist activity(ies). 
3. Such activity(ies) must be a threat to the United States security (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/ 
123085.htm). 
FTO designation plays critical role in the US fight against terrorism and it is an effective means of curtailing support 
for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business. Foreign, as explained earlier, refers to 
non-United States based organization and most of the organizations as at 2014 have been mostly Islamic extremist 
groups; with the remaining largely Communist and nationalist/separatist groups. For the sake of emphasis, the table 
below shows some of the Foreign Terrorist Organizations around the world which includes Boko Haram and their host 
countries. 
 
Table 2: List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations around the World 
 
S/N FTO Other Names Called Host countries
1 Abu Nidal Organization ANO Palestine
2 Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades Palestine
3 Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas Palestine
4 Army of Islam - Palestine
5 Islamic Jihad Group - Palestine
6 Palestine Liberation Front PLF Palestine
7 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP Palestine
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8 PFLP-General Command PFLP-GC Palestine
9 Al-Qaeda Kurdish Battalions (formerly Ansar al-Islam) - Iraqi Kurdish
10 Kata’ib Hezbolah - Iraq
11 Kongra-Gel (formerly Kurdistan Workers Party) KGK, formerly PKK, KADEK Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria 
12 Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad al-Rafidayn (formerly Jama’at al-Tawhid Wa’al Jihad or al-Zarqawi Network) 
QSBR or JTJ or al-Qaida in 
Iraq Iraq 
13 Asbat an-Ansar - Lebanon
14 Party of God Hezbollah Lebanon
15 Kahane Chai Kach Israel
16 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization MEK Iran
17 People’s Resistance Movement of Iran PRMI or Jundallah Iran
18 Al-Qaeda - Global
19 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP Arabian Peninsula
20 Al-Qaeda in  the Islamic Maghreb AQIM Maghreb
21 Haqqani Network - Bangladesh
22 Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islamic Huji-B Bangladesh
23 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam LTTE Sri Lanka
24 Indian Mujahideen IM India
25 Aum Shinrikyo - Japan
26 Harakat ul-Mujahidin HUM Pakistan
27 Jaish-e-Mohammed JEM Pakistan
28 Lashkar-e Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous) LET Muridke and Pakistan 
29 Lashkar I Jhangvi - Pakistan
30 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan TTP Pakistan
31 Jemaah Islamiya Organization JI Brunci, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore 
32 Abu Sayyaf Group ASP Philippines
33 Communist Party of the Philippines (New People’s Army) CCP (NPA) Philippines
34 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IMU Uzbekistan
35 Al-Shabaab - Somalia
36 Armed Islamic Group GIA Algeria
37 Gama’a al-Islamiyya - Egypt
38 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group LIFG Libya
39 Lord’s Resistance Army - Uganda
40 Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group MICG Morocco
41 Continuity Irish Republican Army CIRA UK and Republic of Ireland 
42 Real Irish Republican Army RIRA UK and Republic of Ireland 
43 Ulster Volunteer Force UVF UK and the Republic of Ireland 
44 Ulster Defense Association UDA UK and the Republic of Ireland 
45 Revolutionary Organization 17 November - Greece
46 Revolutionary Struggle - Greece
47 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C Turkey
48 Kurdistan Workers Party PKK Turkey
49 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) ETA Spain and France
50 National Liberation Army ELN Colombia
51 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC Colombia
52 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia AUC Colombia
53 Shining Path (Sendro Luminoso) SL Peru
54 Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid JAT Indonesia
55 Abdullah Azzam Brigades - Iraq
56 Ansar Dine - Mali
57 Boko Haram Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad Nigeria 
58 Ansaru - Nigeria
59 Al-Mulathamun Brigade - Algeria
60 Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi - Libya
61 Ansar al-Sharia in Darnah - Libya
62 Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia - Tunisia
63 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis - Egypt
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._State_Department_list_of_foreign_Terrorist_Organizations, retrieved on 4th June, 2014 
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Let us state therefore that what is called Foreign Terrorist Organization is what the United States says it is. The names by 
which they are called are the names they were designated with by the United States.  
Besides the above condition for designating a group foreign terrorist organization, the Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (S/CT) in the US State Department must look not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has 
carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism 
or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._State_Department_list_ 
of_foreign_Terrorist_Organizations). Once a group has been so identified, the Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism prepares a detailed administrative record, which is a compilation of information, typically including both 
classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If 
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the 
designation, then the US Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven 
days to review the designation, as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires (see section 219 of the INA in the 
2001 USA PATRIOT Act and also retrievable from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._State_Department_list_ of_foreign_ 
Terrorist_Organizations). The INA provides that, upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period, notice of the 
designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. However, an organization 
designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register. 
In line with this, the US government on November 24, 2013 considered Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization 
having met the above qualities of a terrorist group. The figure represents the concentration of Boko Haram attacks in 
Nigeria since 2009. 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/boko-haram 
 
The choice of the figure was due largely to the constant nature of Boko Haram attacks which has virtually made it 
impossible to summarize the information in a table especially between 24th November, 2013 (when the sect was 
designated an FTO) and August 2015. Accordingly, the African director of the United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), Daniel Bekele, observed that: 
Boko Haram attacks have increased during the first two months of 2014, with almost daily killings, bombings, theft, 
and the destruction of schools, homes, and businesses in north-eastern Nigeria villages. These assaults have led to the 
death of (over) 700 people, the abduction of (over) 25 women and girls, and the mass displacement of residents 
(http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-cause-humanitarian-crisis). 
As a corollary, Amnesty International also said that more than 1,500 people were killed during 2014 alone in an 
escalating armed conflict between Boko Haram insurgents and the Nigerian security forces and that more than half of 
these victims were civilians (http://voanews.com/a/amnesty-1500-nigerians-killed-in-boko-haram-violence-in-2014-
/1883187.html). Summarily, over seventeen thousand lives have been lost and property worth billion of Naira destroyed 
since the Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria. 
In fact, what remains the problem is that since the designation of Boko Haram sect as Foreign Terrorist 
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Organization, the group has become more coordinated, ferocious and determined in their attacks against the people and 
constituted authorities in Nigeria. The impression being created is that the US involvement in the fight against Boko 
Haram insurgence by extension means its averred declaration of interest in Nigeria and by implication means more 
attacks against the Nigerian state by the Boko Haram insurgents due to their hatred of the West and their ideologies 
which the United States represents. To the insurgents, since their activities in Nigeria constitute serious concern to the 
United States, it then means that the more they attack the former, the more the latter is affected. This can be taken to be 
the reason for the increasing coordinated, ferocious and determined attacks by the sect, as well as its identification with 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). As at 2015, ISIS has remained a foremost enemy of the West and the leading 
terrorist organization in the world. 
 
 Conclusion 3.
 
The increasing security threat of Boko Haram insurgence has become a source of concern to many countries especially 
the United States; hence, its involvement in finding a lasting solution to the crisis. However, it appears that since the 
United States indicated interest in the fight against the scourge through the designation of the group as a foreign terrorist 
organization on 24th November, 2013, the sect appears to be more coordinated and determined in its violent campaign 
against the Nigerian states with serious pockets of influence within the West African sub region. The height of this 
insurgency remains the abduction of over 200 school girls at Chibok, Borno state which has attracted global 
condemnation. 
In a nutshell, the study attempted to understand the United States national interest and its relationship in the fight 
against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria which is increasingly becoming sarcastically melodramatic. This was done 
through the exploration of the US national interests in Nigeria which can be summarized as follows: stable democracy, 
trade and investment as well as maintenance of regional peace and security for a free-flow of crude oil. A threat to any of 
these would be met with stiff resistance by the United States government especially if such threat has the capability of 
producing far-reaching consequence(s) to the free-flow of crude oil from the Gulf of Guinea. Against this backdrop, the 
continued attacks against the Nigerian state by the Boko Haram insurgents remain a large threat not only to security of 
Nigeria but the entire West African sub region. Hence, for the United States to remain aloof to this dangerous trend is 
akin to bargaining with the devil (international terrorist groups) for goods and services whose only value is production of 
regional and global insecurity. 
Finally, it is important to state here that while direct US involvement in the fight against Boko Haram insurgence 
may not be a good omen for Nigeria, it has become a necessary and unavoidable evil especially as the fight against 
terrorism needs more coordinated support from countries well-equipped technologically which sometimes might be a 
necessary ingredient for breaching national sovereignty. To this end therefore, it is important for the international 
community (not just the United States) to see the fight against Boko Haram terrorism as a collective fight against 
international terrorism and make effort towards arresting the scourge. 
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